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EVOLVING STANDARDS OF 
REASONABLENESS: THE ABA STANDARDS 
AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PLEA 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Margaret Colgate Love* 
ABSTRACT  
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards have been recognized by the 
Supreme Court as one of the most important sources for determining 
lawyer competence in right to counsel cases. Because the constitu-
tional test under the Sixth Amendment is whether defense counsel’s 
performance was “reasonable” under “prevailing professional 
norms,” the standard of competence is necessarily an evolving one. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky underscores the 
defense bar’s stake in participating in the ABA standard-setting pro-
cess to guide the development of defense counsel's obligations in plea 
negotiations. In addition, to the extent the courts give the ABA 
Standards credence in judging ineffective assistance claims, they can 
be powerful catalysts for changing the behavior of other actors in the 
plea process, as well as system norms. The Standards can also be lev-
eraged to help the defense bar gain access to the additional resources 
necessary to comply with the constitutional obligations of defense 
lawyers post-Padilla. Two developments give this problem particular 
urgency: One is the proliferation of status-generated “collateral” pen-
alties affecting every activity of daily life, penalties that are frequently 
more severe than any sentence potentially imposed by the court. The 
other is the broad applicability of these collateral penalties to misde-
meanants and other minor offenders who in the past would have been 
spared the reduced legal status and stigma reserved for convicted fel-
ons. Part I of this Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
 
* Law Office of Margaret Love.  Ms. Love has chaired two drafting task forces of the 
ABA Standards Committee (Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary 
Disqualification of Convicted Persons, 2001–2004, and Standards on the Treatment 
of Prisoners, 2005–2010).  Since 2009 she has served as liaison to the Standards 
Committee from the National Legal Aid & Defender Association.   
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the ABA Standards in Sixth Amendment cases, and Part II discusses 
the manner in which the Standards are developed and approved as 
ABA policy. Part III describes the provisions of the Standards that 
govern plea negotiations, and proposes their expansion in light of the 
new mandate given defense lawyers by Padilla. It concludes by urging 
greater defender participation in the Standards process to shape how 
the Sixth Amendment standard evolves, and to maximize Padilla’s 
systemic effect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In cases applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Su-
preme Court has given credence (if not quite deference) to what the 
bar thinks a lawyer’s duty to the client ought to be.  As the leading 
organization of legal professionals in the United States, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) has been a constant source of received wis-
dom on the topic of lawyer competence.  Through its ethics rules and 
standards, the ABA exerts a powerful influence over how American 
lawyers behave, largely because the courts are their willing enforcers.  
Accordingly, the defense community has an important stake in partic-
ipating in the ABA standard-setting process if it is to have some con-
trol over defender obligations under the Constitution.  This Article 
argues that defense lawyers, particularly public defenders, should par-
ticipate in a more sustained way in the process of developing ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards. 
Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of the ABA Stand-
ards in Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases.  Part II discusses the 
manner in which the Standards are developed and approved as ABA 
policy.  Part III describes the provisions of the Standards that govern 
plea negotiations and proposes their expansion in light of the new 
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mandate given criminal defense lawyers by Padilla v. Kentucky.1  This 
Article concludes by proposing that defender organizations should 
seize the opportunity presented by Padilla to guide how the Sixth 
Amendment standard evolves and to maximize Padilla’s systemic ef-
fect. 
I.  THE ABA STANDARDS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to 
the guilty plea stage of a criminal case.2  Until Padilla, however, the 
Court had not said much about the extent of counsel’s constitutional 
duty to the client in plea negotiations.  Indeed, the Court had even 
suggested that counsel need only advise about rights that the client 
would forego by entering a plea3 and of the “direct” or court-imposed 
consequences that conviction would have.4  
The Padilla Court recognized that counsel’s Sixth Amendment du-
ty to advise the client about the consequences of pleading guilty is 
frequently broader and more subtle, holding that “constitutionally 
competent counsel would have advised [the client] that his conviction 
for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation.”5  
The Court thus ventured farther than any lower federal court in ex-
tending the right to counsel to the substance of a guilty plea, and to 
the consequences of conviction that are not part of the court-imposed 
sentence.  The concurring Justices, noting the “longstanding and 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 1486 (“[T]he negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” (citing 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985))); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 770–71 (1970).   
 3. McMann, 397 U.S. at 769–71; see also Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 
50–51 (1995) (“Apart from the small class of rights that require specific advice from 
the court under Rule 11(c), it is the responsibility of defense counsel to inform a de-
fendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement and the attendant 
statutory and constitutional rights that a guilty plea would forgo.”).  In Hill, 474 U.S. 
at 52–53, the Court did not reach the question whether counsel’s failure to explain 
the terms of parole eligibility was constitutionally deficient, since Hill had not 
claimed that he was prejudiced thereby. 
 4. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (“‘Virtually all jurisdic-
tions’—including ‘eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of 
Columbia’—‘hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collat-
eral consequences of a conviction,’ including deportation” (quoting Gabriel J. Chin & 
Richard Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002))).   
 5. Id. at 1478. 
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unanimous position of the federal courts” that lawyers need not in-
form their clients about this “collateral” consequence of conviction, 
called the Court’s decision “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment 
law” that “will lead to much confusion and needless litigation.”6  The 
dissenters warned that the logic—and thus the reach—of the Court’s 
decision could not be limited to deportation consequences “except by 
judicial caprice.”7   
While the Court’s substantive holding in Padilla was unexpected, 
its constitutional analysis was familiar.  The Court examined whether 
defense counsel’s representation “[fell] below an objective standard 
of reasonableness,” and whether there was “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different.”8  The first part of this test—first ap-
plied by Strickland v. Washington9 in 1984 to trials and by Hill v. 
Lockhart10 in 1985 to pleas—is “necessarily linked to the practice and 
expectations of the legal community: “[t]he proper measure of attor-
ney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms.”11  The Strickland Court referred to “American 
Bar Association standards and the like,” as “guides to determining 
what is reasonable . . . .”12  
Given the Strickland Court’s apparent stamp of approval,  it was 
predictable that lower courts would rely upon ABA standards and 
ethics rules relating to guilty pleas to test the effectiveness of attorney 
performance in a variety of plea-related contexts.13  Still, the courts 
 
 6. Id. at  1487, 1491, 1487 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
 7. Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 1481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 (1984)). 
 9. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 10. 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 11. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  
 12. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  In the years after Strickland, the Court repeatedly 
cited the ABA Standards in measuring effective attorney performance under Strick-
land’s first prong. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (“[W]e long 
have referred [to these ABA Standards] as ‘guides to determining what is reasona-
ble.’”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (“[ABA]standards to which we 
long have referred as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable’”). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994) (“De-
fense counsel should conclude a plea agreement only with the consent of the defend-
ant, and should ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere is ultimately made by the defendant.” (citing ABA Pleas of Guilty Stand-
Standards)); Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the American Bar Association Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice likewise indicate that a defendant should be informed about and partici-
pate in the plea bargaining process.”); Jiminez v. State, 144 P.3d 903, 906 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2006) (“Competent representation under prevailing professional norms 
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stopped short of finding an affirmative obligation to advise the client 
about collateral consequences.14 In Padilla, the Court took the plunge 
that the lower courts had worked hard to avoid, holding that “[t]he 
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that coun-
sel must advise her client [considering a guilty plea] regarding the risk 
of deportation.”15 In the process, the Court reaffirmed and extended 
Strickland’s reliance on the ABA Standards as “valuable measures of 
the prevailing professional norms of effective representation,”16 citing 
two separate volumes of the Standards in addition to a variety of 
practice guides and treatises.17  
The fact that the constitutional test of effective representation is 
“necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal com-
munity”18 has two important and related results.  One is that the test 
is continually evolving.  The other is that the legal community has a 
degree of control over what the Constitution means.  The Padilla 
Court suggested as much when it noted, in support of its holding, how 
much emphasis the defense bar has placed on standard-setting and 
training in immigration law issues.19 
 
includes, at a bare minimum, communicating with the client concerning offers to set-
tle a case” (citing Oklahoma ethics rules and ABA Standards)); Davie v. State, 381 
S.C. 601, 609 (2009) (failure to communicate with client about a plea offer “consti-
tutes unreasonable performance under the prevailing professional standards estab-
lished by the American Bar Association or state-specific ethical rules of conduct”); 
State v. James, 739 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (counsel’s duty under eth-
ics rules and ABA Standards includes “not only communicating actual offers, but dis-
cussion of tentative plea negotiations and the strengths and weaknesses of defend-
ants’ case so that the defendants know what to expect and can make an informed 
judgment whether or not to plead guilty”).  
 14. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring). See generally Jenny 
Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misin-
formation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 131–139 (2009) (analyzing 
the “affirmative misadvice” rule as a “flawed exception to the flawed collateral con-
sequences rule”). 
 15. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83.  The Court cited the ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4–5.1(a) (3d 
ed. 1993) [hereinafter DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS or PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
STANDARDS, depending upon the section cited] and the STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14–3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter PLEAS OF GUILTY 
STANDARDS], as well as the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Perfor-
mance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995), a Justice Department 
compendium of standards for indigent defense systems, and a variety of academic 
treatises and law review articles. 
 18. Id. at 1482. 
 19. Id. 
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As might be expected, at least some of the Justices are not entirely 
comfortable with ceding even a limited degree of control over the 
constitutional test to private membership organizations.  Thus, some 
professional codes and practice guides are accorded greater deference 
than others.  For example, in Bobby v. Van Hook, the Court disap-
proved in a per curiam opinion of the lower court’s reliance on a de-
tailed set of ABA Guidelines enacted in 2003 long after the defend-
ant’s trial.20  The Court distinguished the 2003 Guidelines from more 
general ABA standards in effect at the trial.21  In doing so, the Court 
pointed out that the 131-page 2003 Guidelines “expanded what had 
been (in the 1980 [Criminal Justice] Standards) a broad outline of de-
fense counsel’s duties in all criminal cases into detailed prescriptions 
for legal representation of capital defendants.”22  The Court objected 
to treating the more detailed standards as “inexorable commands,” as 
opposed to “‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means,” reserving 
the possibility that it might “accept the legitimacy” of guidelines that 
did not “interfere with the constitutionally-protected independence of 
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making 
tactical decisions.”23  Justice Alito concurred separately to underscore 
his objection to according any “special relevance” to the 2003 ABA 
Guidelines, noting that the “venerable” ABA “is, after all, a private 
group with limited membership.”24  Justice Alito further noted that 
“[t]he views of the association’s members, not to mention the views of 
the members of the advisory committee that formulated the 2003 
 
 20. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (holding that the 2003 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Pen-
alty Cases were “quite different” from the Standards for Criminal Justice that the 
Court had approved in Strickland as an appropriate guide to what is reasonable per-
formance under the Sixth Amendment).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  More specifically, the 2003 Guidelines  
discuss the duty to investigate mitigating evidence in exhaustive detail, spec-
ifying what attorneys should look for, where to look, and when to begin. See 
ABA Guidelines 10.7, comment., at 80–85. They include, for example, the 
requirement that counsel’s investigation cover every period of the defend-
ant’s life from “the moment of conception,” id. at 81, and that counsel con-
tact ‘virtually everyone . . . who knew [the defendant] and his family’ and 
obtain records ‘concerning not only the client, but also his parents, grand-
parents, siblings, and children,’ id. at 83. Judging counsel’s conduct in the 
1980s on the basis of these 2003 Guidelines—without even pausing to con-
sider whether they reflected the prevailing professional practice at the time 
of the trial—was error. 
Id. 
 23. Id. at 17 n.1.   
 24. Id. at 20.    
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Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar 
as a whole.”25 
II.  THE ABA STANDARDS PROCESS 
The two most respected sources of criminal defense lawyers’ pro-
fessional duties to the client are the ABA Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.  The Model 
Rules are generally made directly enforceable against the lawyers 
who violate them by incorporating state codes of lawyer ethics.  That 
way, the model rules are literally part of the “prevailing professional 
norms” to which lawyers in a given jurisdiction are bound.  A lawyer 
who violates some specific ethical duty owed to the client under ap-
plicable rules is almost by definition guilty of deficient performance.  
(Of course, such deficient performance may or may not prejudice the 
client so as to violate the Sixth Amendment.) 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice likewise spell out a law-
yer’s duty to his or her client.  Because, however, the Standards are 
generally not incorporated into enforceable codes of lawyer conduct, 
they are less clearly a necessary measure of constitutionally deficient 
performance.  Over the years, the Standards have earned their place 
as a measure of “prevailing professional norms” for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment because the process by which they are developed is 
a thorough and balanced one. 
The Standards are a multi-volume collection of best practices cov-
ering almost every aspect of the criminal process, ranging from famil-
iar areas like pre-trial release, sentencing, and post-conviction reme-
dies, to more contemporary issues involving technological means of 
surveillance and DNA evidence.26  When the Standards project began 
 
 25. Id.  The 2003 Guidelines were a joint project of the ABA Standing Committee 
on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants and the ABA Special Committee on Death 
Penalty Representation. See American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 913, 914 (2003).  The long list of acknowledgments introducing the Guidelines 
does not appear to include any prosecutors or government representatives, or any 
official liaisons to the project from national organizations representing prosecutors or 
attorneys general. See id.  Nor do any sitting judges appear to have participated in 
the project. See id.  By contrast, as described in the following section, the process for 
developing the Criminal Justice Standards has from the beginning of the project in 
the 1960s been regarded as reflecting the views of all segments of the profession. See 
Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of 
Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 14–15 (2009).   
 26. A complete set of the Standards, which are divided into volumes by topical 
area, and a history of their development, are available at 
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in 1964 under the aegis of then-ABA President (and later Justice) 
Lewis Powell, such standards were “a novel concept.”27  When he in-
troduced the first edition of the Standards in 1974, Warren Burger 
(who had been chair of the Standards project until his appointment as 
Chief Justice in 1969) described the project as “the single most com-
prehensive and probably the most monumental undertaking in the 
field of criminal justice ever attempted by the American legal profes-
sion in our national history” and recommended that “[e]veryone con-
nected with criminal justice . . . become totally familiar with their sub-
stantive content.”28  Since that time, the seventeen original volumes of 
the Standards have been revised, in some cases several times, and 
new topics have been added to address newly-developed technology 
and newly important topics.29  The Standards have proved a valuable 
resource for the courts,30 for practitioners,31 and for the academy.32 
 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards.html.  The his-
tory of the Standards, their use by courts, and the process by which they are devel-
oped, are usefully elaborated in Marcus, supra note 25, at 14–15.  At the time his arti-
cle was published, Judge Marcus was particularly well-qualified to comment on the 
Standards process, having been involved in it for a number of years as chair of several 
drafting task forces, as a member of the Committee, and as the Committee’s chair. 
See also Rory K. Little, The Role of Reporter to a Law Project, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 747 (2011) (describing the process of revising the Criminal Justice Standards for 
the Prosecution and Defense Function, by the reporter to that project).  
 27. B.J. George, Jr., Symposium on the American Bar Association’s Mental 
Health Standards: An Overview, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338, 388–39 (1985).  
 28. Warren E. Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251 (1974). 
 29. Among volumes recently approved for the Third Edition are Special Func-
tions of the Trial Judge (2000); Electronic Surveillance of Private Communications 
(2002); Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons 
(2004); Speedy Trial and Timely Resolution of Criminal Cases (2006), and Treatment 
of Prisoners (2010).  The black letter of Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations has 
been approved, with publication forthcoming.  The on-going revisions of the Prosecu-
tion and Defense Function Standards will be the first volumes in the Fourth Edition.  
 30. Marcus reports that “[a] recent Westlaw search indicates that more than 120 
Supreme Court opinions quote from or cite to the Standards and/or their accompany-
ing commentary,” and “[o]ver the past 40 years, the federal circuit courts have cited 
to the Standards in some 700 opinions, beginning the year the first Standards were 
published.” Marcus, supra note 25, at 11 (citing Bruce v. U.S., 379 F.2d 113, 120 n.19 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (citing Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty)).  In addition, the 
Standards have “had a major impact on court rules.” Id. 
 31. See Marcus, supra note 25, at 12 (citing examples).  
 32. A Symposium: The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice, Part II, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415 (1975); A Sympo-
sium: The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of 
Criminal Justice, Part I, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251–414 (1974); B.J. George, Jr., 
supra note 26; Marcus, supra note 25, at 13 (citing Symposium on the Collateral Sanc-
tions in Theory and Practice, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 441 (2005)).  To these might be add-
LOVE_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:04 PM 
2011] EVOLVING STANDARDS 155 
The process by which the Standards are created underscores their 
influence.  All segments of the criminal justice bar and bench are rep-
resented in their development, initially by a drafting task force and 
subsequently by the Standards Committee, which is a standing com-
mittee of the Criminal Justice Section whose nine members are com-
posed of prosecutors, defense attorneys, academics, and judges.33  
Nonvoting liaisons from the major national organizations of prosecu-
tors and defense lawyers, the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral and the U.S. Department of Justice, also participate at each stage 
of the work.34  The balance of interests that these participants reflect 
has been a key feature of the process of developing the Standards 
since the inception of the project in the 1960s.35  This balance remains 
 
ed Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1 (2011), devoted to the 2010 Treatment of Prisoners Standards, and Justin 
Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in §2254 Habeas 
Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2011), Lissa Griffin & Stacy Caplow, 
Changes to the Culture of Adversaries: Endorsing Candor, Cooperation and Civility 
in Relationship Between Prosecutors and Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 845 (2011), devoted to the revisions of the Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function Standards. 
 33. About Criminal Justice Standards, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards.html (last visit-
ed Dec. 29, 2011). 
 34. See Marcus supra note 25, at 14–15.  Marcus describes the progress of a draft 
from task force to Standards Committee to CJS Council as follows:  
With the chair presiding over its discussions, a particular task force may 
meet from four to eight times until a draft is finalized. At each meeting, the 
discussion focuses on extensive memoranda and preliminary drafts.  The 
task force reporter, usually a law professor, judge, or practitioner, well-
schooled and experienced in the subject matter of the Standards—has dis-
seminated well in advance of each meeting. . . .  [O]nce a task force draft is 
completed, it is sent to the Standards Committee. In a series of its own 
meetings, the committee, aided by the task force chair and reporter, re-
views, revises, and approves the draft. Although the Standards Committee 
recognizes and often defers to the expertise of those specialists who serve 
on the task force and to the compromises reached in task force meetings, 
the discussions in the Standards Committee are often spirited and may lead 
to significant, substantive changes, as well as stylistic ones, in the Standards 
draft. As in the task forces, though, the goal is persuasion and consensus; 
close votes on the language of a particular Standard are rare . . . . 
Id.  
 35. In 1974, Chief Justice Burger described the ABA committee that developed 
the first edition of the Standards as comprised of “more than 100 of the nation’s lead-
ing jurists, lawyers and legal scholars operating in advisory committees of 10 or 12 
each,” with “the participants . . . drawn from every part of the country and includ[ing] 
state and federal judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense lawyers, public defenders, 
law professors, penology experts and police officials.” See Burger, supra note 28, at 
251.  This broad range of experience and perspective made the Standards “much 
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essential to the status accorded the Standards by the courts in the 
Sixth Amendment context as the measure of “prevailing professional 
norms of effective representation” against which a criminal defense 
lawyer’s performance will be tested.36 
The draft that emerges from the Standards Committee then under-
goes two readings, months apart, in the ABA Criminal Justice Section 
Council.37  The Council’s membership is also intentionally balanced.38  
Along the way, drafts are widely circulated and comments are invit-
ed.39  While a Standards project has occasionally become controver-
sial at the Council level, it has never been impossible to achieve con-
sensus.  Before the Standards become official ABA policy, they must 
be approved by vote of the ABA House of Delegates, which is a body 
 
more than a theoretical and idealistic restatement of the law, but rather a synthesis of 
the experience of a diverse and highly experienced group of professionals.” Id.  
 36. See, e.g., Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (contrasting the Stand-
ards with the 2003 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of De-
fense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases); supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  
Since the early 1990s, there has been a formal membership quota system intended to 
keep membership on the Standards Committee balanced between prosecutors and 
defenders, with academics and judges together constituting a third interest group.  
However, this system seems to have resulted over the years in a larger representation 
of prosecutors than of defenders on the Standards Committee—at least if one under-
stands a defender to be someone whose career has been devoted to defense work. It 
has struck this observer that prosecutors who leave government to engage in defense 
work rarely become public defenders, frequently do not lose a prosecutorial perspec-
tive, and may even return to government midway through their term on the commit-
tee.  Accordingly, defender representatives on the Standards Committee, as on the 
Criminal Justice Section Council, may not share a common viewpoint and speak with 
one voice in the same way that prosecutors do.  In recent years, public defenders 
have been in particularly short supply on both the Standards Committee and the 
Council, which makes the liaison role of the national defender organizations particu-
larly important.  
 37. See Marcus, supra note 25, at 15. 
 38. See id. 
 39. The procedure after the Standards Committee submits its approved draft of 
the black letter to the Criminal Justice Section Council is described as follows:  
Again with the assistance of the task force chair and reporter, the Council 
reviews, revises, and approves draft Standards in at least two meetings, in 
which the Standards receive a first and second “reading.” Before each read-
ing, drafts are circulated widely within and outside the ABA, and comments 
are solicited, not only from the Section’s own committees, but also from the 
national organizations represented on the Council and other potentially in-
terested individuals and organizations. As in the Standards Committee, de-
spite the deference owed and given to the expertise and effort that pro-
duced the draft before the Council, significant changes may result from the 
Council’s discussions as the body seeks to achieve a final consensus of opin-
ion. 
Id. at 15. 
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composed of more than 500 representatives from states and territo-
ries, state and local bar associations, affiliated organizations, ABA 
sections, divisions, and members, and the Attorney General of the 
United States, among others.40  Once the House approves the Stand-
ards, they become the official policy of the 400,000 member ABA.41   
Many steps must be completed before the Standards are finally 
adopted as ABA policy, and a broad array of viewpoints are involved 
in the process.  The preparation of commentary, which takes place af-
ter ABA House approval, consumes at least another year.  It is thus 
easy to see why the entire process frequently takes more than five 
years to complete, even just for a revision of an existing volume.  But 
after all is said and done, the ABA can confidently claim that the 
practical guidance reflected in the Standards is “based on the consen-
sus views of a broad array of professionals involved in the criminal 
justice system.”42  It can also be assured that the Standards will be 
perceived as “a balanced, practical work intended to walk the fine 
line between the protection of society and the protection of the con-
stitutional rights of accused individual[s].”43 
Before leaving the discussion of the arduous and time-consuming 
process by which the ABA Standards are hammered out, it bears em-
phasizing that the defense bar can and should have a significant influ-
ence over that process.  It must insist on doing so where defense 
counsel’s performance is at issue because, as the Court emphasized in 
Padilla, the bar’s standard-setting entities have considerable influence 
over what the Sixth Amendment requires.44  To the extent the ABA 
can be said to speak for the bar (pace Justice Alito45), it is in the 
Standards process more than anywhere else that “prevailing profes-
sional norms of effective representation” will emerge.  Accordingly, 
the defense community has an important stake in paying close atten-
tion to and participating actively in the Standards process if it is to 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Missouri v. Frye (No. 10-444) and Lafler v. Cooper (No. 10-209), 2011 WL 
3151278 at *2–*3. 
 43. Burger, supra note 28, at 252.   
 44. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83. 
 45. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The 
ABA is a venerable organization with a history of service to the bar, but it is, after 
all, a private group with limited membership.  The views of the association’s mem-
bers, not to mention the views of the members of the advisory committee that formu-
lated the 2003 Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as 
a whole.”). 
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have some control over how its evolving Sixth Amendment obliga-
tions are reflected and codified in the Standards. 
III.  EVOLVING STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS 
A. Current ABA Standards Relating to Representation in Plea 
Negotiations 
The ABA Standards emphasize a defense lawyer’s duty to repre-
sent a client competently in the pretrial stages of a criminal case, in-
cluding in plea negotiations.  This means that, at a minimum, counsel 
must “keep the defendant advised of developments arising out of plea 
discussions conducted with the prosecuting attorney, and . . . prompt-
ly communicate and explain to the defendant all plea offers made by 
the prosecuting attorney.”46  Counsel must also “explore the possibil-
ity of an early diversion of the case from the criminal process”47 and 
“promptly communicate and explain to the accused all significant plea 
proposals made by the prosecutor.”48  The ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards have contained these requirements for more than thirty 
years,49 and they have been cited by numerous courts both before and 
after Strickland as establishing the norm of effective representation in 
 
 46. See PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(a).  
 47. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 4-6.1(a); see 
also PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(e) (“At the outset 
of a case and whenever the law, nature and circumstances of the case permit, defense 
counsel must ‘explore the possibility of a diversion of the case from the criminal pro-
cess.’”). 
 48. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 4-6.2(b).  The 
commentary to Standard 4-6.2 explains: 
Because plea discussions are usually held without the accused being present, 
the lawyer has the duty to communicate fully to the client the substance of 
the discussions. . . .  It is important that the accused be informed . . . of pro-
posals made by the prosecutor; the accused, not the lawyer, has the right to 
decide . . . [on] prosecution proposal[s], even when a proposal is one that 
the lawyer would not approve. If the accused’s choice on the question of a 
guilty plea is to be an informed one, the accused must act with full aware-
ness of the alternatives, including any that arise from proposals made by the 
prosecutor.  
Id. 
 49. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 4-6.2(a); PLEAS 
OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(a), (b).  The ethical duty to 
convey and advise about a plea offer was also contained in the 1969 Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility that antedated the Model Rules. See, e.g., MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) (“A defense lawyer in a criminal case has 
the duty to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to 
be desirable and as to the prospects of success on appeal, but it is for the client to de-
cide what plea should be entered and whether an appeal should be taken.”).   
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the guilty plea context.50  They reflect the judgment that the decision 
to plead guilty is so vital that it is specifically identified in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct as one of the very few that cannot be 
made by the lawyer alone.51  Thus, the decision whether to plead and 
what plea agreement to accept are “ultimately for the accused . . . af-
ter full consultation with counsel.”52  The Standards also require that 
a lawyer must fully explain and advise about the choices available to a 
client considering a plea offer, after conducting an appropriate inves-
tigation and analysis of all pertinent issues of fact and law: 
[T]o aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after 
appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the alter-
natives available and considerations deemed important by defense 
counsel or the defendant in reaching a decision.  Defense counsel 
should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless 
appropriate investigation and study of the case has been complet-
ed.53 
The commentary to this Standard explains that “[t]his is a critical 
standard because the system relies, at heart, on defense counsel to en-
 
 50. See cases cited supra note 13; see also State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1198 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Perry, 68 P.3d 472, 477 (Colo. App. 2002); Cottle v. 
State, 733 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1999); Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2–3 (Ga. 1988); 
People v. Ferguson, 413 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Lyles v. State, 382 
N.E.2d 991, 993–94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Alexander, 518 N.Y.S.2d 872, 879 
(N.Y. 1987); State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 493, 497 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Harris v. 
State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1984); Becton v. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762, 766 (W. Va. 1999). 
 51. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (a lawyer “must abide by 
the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify”); id. R. 1.4(a)(1) (a 
lawyer must “promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect 
to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required by these rules”); id. R. 1.4(b) (a 
lawyer must “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions”).  The first example in the commentary to Rule 1.4 of 
this duty to inform the client is that “a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel . . . 
a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its sub-
stance.” Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (matters are “fundamental” or “substantive” because they 
are highly personal or derive from constitutional guarantees).   
 52. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 4-5.2(a).  The 
commentary to Standard 4-5.2 explains that “because of the fundamental nature of 
decisions such as these, so crucial to the accused’s fate, the accused must make the 
decisions himself or herself.” Id. 
 53. See PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(b); see also 
DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 4-6.1(b) (“Under no cir-
cumstances should defense counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea 
unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed, including 
analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced.”).  
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sure that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and 
is entered in his or her best interests.”54 
The Standards caution courts not to accept a plea “where it ap-
pears the defendant has not had the effective assistance of counsel.”55  
At the same time, the standards envision a comparatively modest role 
for the court in apprising a defendant about the consequences of a 
plea: 
Although the court must inquire into the defendant’s understanding 
of the possible consequences at the time the plea is received . . . this 
inquiry is not, of course, any substitute for advice by counsel.  The 
court’s warning comes just before the plea is taken, and may not af-
ford time for mature reflection. The defendant cannot, without risk 
of making damaging admissions, discuss candidly with the court the 
questions he or she may have.  Moreover, there are relevant consid-
erations that may not be covered by the judge in his or her admoni-
tion.  A defendant needs to know, for example, the probability of 
conviction in the event of trial.56 
The Standards currently say very little about the prosecutor’s role 
in ensuring that a defendant understands the consequences of plead-
ing guilty, except to say that prosecutors should not misrepresent 
facts or law in plea negotiations57 or lead an unrepresented person to 
believe that the prosecutor is “on [his or her] side.”58 
Until 1999, the Standards did not specifically refer to “collateral 
consequences”59 in the context of plea negotiations.60  In the third edi-
 
 54. See PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(b). 
 55. See id. Standard 14-1.4(c) (“The court should advise the defendant to consult 
with defense counsel if the defendant needs additional information concerning the 
potential consequences of the plea.”).  The commentary to this Standard notes that a 
similar provision was contained in the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, prom-
ulgated in 1987. See UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 444(b)(2) (1987) (court “may not accept the 
plea if it appears that the defendant has not had the effective assistance of counsel”). 
 56. PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2 cmt.   
 57. See PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 3-4.1(c). 
 58. Id., cmt.  
 59. The term “collateral consequences” has become a familiar term describing the 
legal penalties and disabilities to which people are exposed when they plead guilty to 
a crime, though the term “status-generated penalties” might be more apt and legally 
precise.  See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him 
vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also se-
riously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”).  The Padilla Court cast 
doubt on the usefulness of the term “collateral” to describe these penalties for pur-
poses of the Sixth Amendment. See 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“We . . .have never applied a 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of consti-
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tion revision of the Pleas of Guilty Standards, Standard 14-3.2(f) asks 
defense counsel, “[t]o the extent possible,” to “determine and advise 
the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to 
the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of 
the contemplated plea.”61  The commentary to this Standard urges 
counsel to “interview the client to determine what collateral conse-
quences are likely to be important to a client given the client’s partic-
ular personal circumstances and the charges the client faces,” and to 
“be active rather than passive, taking the initiative to learn about 
rules in this area rather than waiting for questions from the defend-
ant.”62  It also notes that since the second edition of the Standards was 
published in 1980, “the number and significance of potential collateral 
consequences had grown to such an extent that it [was] important to 
have a separate standard to address this obligation.”63  The “separate 
standard,” however, consists of a single sentence, and the obligation it 
imposes is modestly hedged by the introductory phrase “to the extent 
possible.”64   
The Pleas of Guilty Standards contemplate that the court will par-
ticipate in alerting a defendant considering a guilty plea about possi-
ble collateral consequences.65  Since, however,  “only defense counsel 
is in a position to ensure that the defendant is aware of the full range 
of consequences that may apply in his or her case,”66 in the absence of 
 
tutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”).  Thus, the term is used in this Arti-
cle for descriptive purposes only, or because it is used in existing ABA Standards.   
 60. The 1981 Criminal Justice Standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners con-
tained a section on “Civil Disabilities of Convicted Persons.” See Legal Status of 
Prisoners, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_prisoners_status. 
html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011).  Because, however, those Standards contemplated 
that such “disabilities” would be imposed on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to au-
tomatically upon conviction, there was no connection with guilty pleas or sentencing.  
Twenty years before, the drafters of the Model Penal Code had been more prescient 
in seeing that link. See Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In 
Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 
1711–13 (2003) (describing § 306.6 of the 1962 Model Penal Code). 
 61. See PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(f). 
 62. Id., cmt. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-1.4(c) (“The 
court should also advise the defendant that by entering the plea, the defendant may 
face additional consequences including but not limited to . . . if the defendant is not a 
United States citizen, a change in the defendant’s immigration status.”). 
 66. Id. Standard 14-3.2 cmt. 
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a court rule, the court’s admonishment is primarily a means of con-
firming that counsel’s duty of advisement has been carried out.67 
In summary, the current Standards give effect to an accused indi-
vidual’s paramount right to make a fully informed decision as to 
whether or not to plead guilty, a decision that is “fundamental” or 
“substantive” because it is highly personal and derives from constitu-
tional guarantees.68  The Standards emphasize that defense counsel 
plays a pivotal role in advising the accused individual at this critical 
stage of the case.  If counsel fails to fully and accurately explain the 
choices that a client faces, the client will be effectively deprived of the 
right to knowingly and intelligently make a decision that will predict-
ably have a dramatic effect on his or her future.  While the Standards 
acknowledge a role for the court in admonishing the defendant about 
the range of status-generated “collateral consequences” that flow 
from a guilty plea, they also emphasize that “only defense counsel is 
in a position to ensure that the defendant is aware of the full range of 
consequences that may apply in his or her case.”69  The Standards 
recognized well before the courts that defense counsel’s advisement 
role under the Sixth Amendment is very different from that of the 
court under the Due Process Clause.70 
B. The Need for Revisions to the Standards Post-Padilla 
The ABA Standards provide an adequate framework for delineat-
ing defense counsel’s role in counseling clients in plea negotiations.  
In many respects, that framework is an excellent one.  But Padilla 
confirms the need not only for additional practical guidance, but also 
for an expansion of the legal profession’s expectation of how compe-
tent defense counsel should perform.  Two developments give this 
 
 67. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 19-2.3(f) (3d ed. 2004) 
(the court should “ensure, before accepting a plea of guilty, that the defendant has 
been informed of collateral sanctions made applicable to the offense . . . by confirm-
ing on the record that defense counsel’s duty of advisement under Standard 14-3.2(f) 
has been discharged”). 
 68. See supra note 51; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 745, 751 (1983) (rec-
ognizing that decisions about fundamental matters, including decision to plead guilty, 
are reserved for the defendant). 
 69. See PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2 cmt. 
 70. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after Padilla v. Ken-
tucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012) [hereinafter Love, Punishment to Regulation] (criticizing the collateral conse-
quences doctrine as applied by the courts before Padilla, based on a failure to differ-
entiate the institutional advisement roles of court and counsel). 
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problem a degree of urgency.  One is the proliferation of status-
generated penalties affecting every activity of daily life—penalties 
that are frequently more severe than any sentence that a court may 
potentially impose.71  The other is the broad applicability of these col-
lateral penalties to misdemeanants and other minor offenders who in 
the past would have been spared the reduced legal status and stigma 
reserved for convicted felons.72 
Cases decided since Padilla suggest that competent counsel will be 
required, as a matter of constitutional law, to warn a client consider-
ing a guilty plea about the consequences of conviction that are severe, 
certain, and of predictable importance to the client, and whether the-
se consequences arise from statute, regulation, or contract.73  To catch 
up to this fast-moving judicial train, the ABA Standards should be 
expanded to include a checklist of duties in connection with plea ne-
gotiation to elaborate the general competence requirements in the ex-
isting Standards, including how defense counsel should relate to other 
actors in the process where collateral  penalties are concerned.  Such 
a checklist74 should include, at a minimum: 
 
 71.  The trend noted in the 1999 Pleas of Guilty Standards has accelerated in the 
years since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. See supra note 62. See generally Margaret 
Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uni-
form Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 770–74 (2011) 
(describing expanded scope and severity of collateral penalties in federal and state 
law in past two decades).  In a NIJ-funded compilation of collateral consequences in 
every U.S. jurisdiction, the American Bar Association has tentatively identified thou-
sands of laws and regulations imposing penalties based on conviction. See Gabriel J. 
Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at 
Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L. REV. 675, 686–86 (2011). 
 72. See generally Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. (2012) (forthcoming 2012) (describing how “minor criminal convictions lead to 
major collateral consequences”).  In the past, in some jurisdictions misdemeanants 
were ineligible to apply for executive clemency on the theory that they had no need 
for this relief.  Today, in recognition of the change in this situation, many state clem-
ency dockets include a large proportion of applications from misdemeanants. See 
generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE (2008), 
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/publication.cfm?publication_id= 
115 (providing state-by-state data on the frequency of clemency grants). 
 73. See Love, Punishment to Regulation, supra note 70. 
 74. In functioning as a “checklist,” the Standards must steer a course between 
“broad outline” and “detailed prescriptions” that “interfere with the constitutionally 
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have 
in making tactical decisions.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984); 
see Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2009).  Too little detail makes the Stand-
ards unhelpful as practice guidance, and too much detail makes them unenforceable 
by courts.  A revision of the Defense Function Standards underway at the time of this 
writing would seem to present an opportune vehicle for development of such a check-
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• Identifying and advising the client about all consequences 
of conviction that are likely to be important to the client, in 
time to enable the client to consider this information in de-
ciding whether to pursue trial, plea, or other dispositions;75 
• Seeking dispositions and sentences that avoid or minimize 
applicable collateral penalties in accordance with the cli-
ent’s goals;76 
• Considering collateral penalties in negotiations with the 
prosecutor over particular dispositions (including disposi-
tions that avoid conviction),77 and in communications with 
 
list.  The general desirability of checklists to help professionals navigate complex sit-
uations is described in ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET 
THINGS RIGHT (2009). 
 75. PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-3.2(f) requires 
identification and advisement about collateral consequences “[t]o the extent possi-
ble.”  The Collateral Sanctions Standards require that jurisdictions should “collect, 
set out or reference all collateral sanctions in a single chapter of the jurisdiction’s 
criminal code.” Collateral Sanctions Standard 19-2.1; see also Collateral Sanctions 
Standard 19-2.3(a) (providing that the court should “ensure, before accepting a plea 
of guilty that the defendant has been  informed of collateral sanctions made applica-
ble to the offense or offenses of conviction under the law of the state or territory 
where the prosecution is pending, and under federal law.”).   The commentary to 
Collateral Sanctions Standard 19-2.3 provides that “[c]ollection of applicable collat-
eral sanctions pursuant to Standard 19-2.1 will make it possible for lawyers to give 
full advice in all cases.  Thus, the contingency in Standard 14-3.2(f) that qualifies de-
fense counsel’s duty would no longer pertain.”  The inventory required by Standard 
19-2.1 will be confined to statutory and regulatory consequences, so that defense 
counsel must question a client closely about sanctions that may be imposed by private 
contract.   
 76. For example, PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-
3.2(e) requires that “[a]t the outset of a case and whenever the law, nature and cir-
cumstances of the case permit, defense counsel should ‘explore the possibility’ of a 
diversion of the case from the criminal process.”  A similar requirement is contained 
in Defense Function Standards, supra note 17, Standard 4-6.1(a). See PLEAS OF 
GUILTY STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 14-4.1 (providing that diversion may be 
appropriate based on “special characteristics or difficulties of the offender”) (citing 
National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards, § 44.4(b) 
(2d ed. 1991)).  There are other dispositions that may avoid conviction and thus col-
lateral consequences. See Margaret Colgate Love, Alternatives to Conviction: De-
ferred Adjudication as a Way of Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT. 
RPT. 6 (2009).  Certain convictions or sentences may avoid particular collateral con-
sequences. Id. 
 77. See supra note 74; see also National District Attorneys Association, National 
Prosecution Standards 4-1.3 (3d ed. 2009) (providing that “undue hardship . . . to the 
accused” can be a basis not to charge or to agree to a particular plea); U.S. Attor-
ney’s Manual 9-28.1000(A) (1997) (stating that with corporate defendants, 
“[p]rosecutors may consider the collateral consequences” in determining “whether to 
charge” and “how to resolve” the case). 
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the court or court officers regarding the appropriate sen-
tence or conditions to be imposed;78 and 
• Advising the client about applicable procedures for obtain-
ing relief from collateral sanctions, including expungement 
or sealing of records of conviction and arrest, certificates of 
relief from disabilities, and pardon.79 
The availability of a full inventory of collateral consequences is ob-
viously necessary to make practicable the duty of advisement de-
scribed above.80  While the situation of clients who are not citizens 
may have a particular urgency in light of the almost-irremediable con-
sequence of deportation, there are many other kinds of consequences 
that impose significant and lasting burdens on clients that must be 
 
 78. For example, Collateral Sanctions Standard 19-2.4 (“Consideration of collat-
eral sanctions at sentencing” provides that a “legislature should authorize the sen-
tencing court to take into account, and the court should consider, applicable collat-
eral sanctions in determining an offender’s overall sentence.”).   
 79. The Collateral Sanctions Standards provide several opportunities to avoid or 
mitigate collateral sanctions.  Standard 19-2.4 provides that a court at sentencing 
should be authorized to take them into account in determining the overall sentence.  
Standard 19-2.5 provides that a court (or administrative agency) should be authorized 
“to enter an order waiving, modifying, or granting timely and effective relief from 
any collateral sanction imposed by the law of that jurisdiction.”  There will be occa-
sions when “timely and effective” relief can only be granted at sentencing itself, as 
where a defendant sentenced to probation will otherwise lose his job or home or re-
tirement income.  The availability of relief from collateral sanctions in post-
conviction proceedings has been held relevant in constitutional challenges to their 
imposition in the first instance. See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) (“The 
retroactive application of the lifetime registration requirement and quarterly in-
person verification procedures of SORNA of 1999 to offenders originally sentenced 
subject to SORNA of 1991 and SORNA of 1995, without, at a minimum, affording 
those offenders any opportunity to ever be relieved of the duty as was permitted un-
der those laws, is, by the clearest proof, punitive, and violates the Maine and United 
States Constitutions’ prohibitions against ex post facto laws.”); Doe v. Sex Offender 
Registration Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 309 (Mass. 2008) (“[T]he retroactive imposition of 
the registration requirement without an opportunity to overcome the conclusive pre-
sumption of dangerousness that flows solely from Doe’s conviction, violates his right 
to due process under the Massachusetts Constitution.”).   
 80. See Chin, supra note 71, at 678 (“It is pointless to impose a duty on defense 
counsel that cannot be satisfied, either because it expects herculean research efforts, 
or because it will accept superficial advice based on moderate research.”).  In 2008, 
Congress directed the Department of Justice to carry out a nationwide survey of col-
lateral consequences, a project now underway under the auspices of the American 
Bar Association.  See supra note 71.  It is expected that the ABA research project 
will create a comprehensive database of collateral consequences, though it will re-
main for particular jurisdictions to put this data into usable form, and it will have to 
be updated as new laws are passed and existing laws are amended. 
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addressed in the earliest stages of plea discussions.81  An inventory of 
collateral consequences will not only make it more practicable for de-
fense counsel to discharge their duty of advisement, but it will also fa-
cilitate the court’s responsibility to ensure that a defendant pleading 
guilty has been appropriately advised,82 and the government’s respon-
sibility to reassure the public that a case has been dealt with in a just 
manner, consistent with public safety.83 
The second development that gives urgency to the project of elabo-
rating performance standards for defense counsel relating to collat-
eral consequences is the disproportionate severity of collateral penal-
ties attaching to even the most minor offenses, which has raised the 
stakes on early pleas where counsel has not had time to adequately 
investigate the client’s situation.  More generally, it has raised anew 
issues of whether and when persons who are not exposed to a prison 
sentence should be entitled to counsel before they give up their right 
to contest their guilt.84  The facts of life in busy misdemeanor courts 
 
 81. See, e.g., Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 491-92 (Tenn. 2011) (ineffective as-
sistance in failure to warn client pleading guilty to sex offense about lifetime supervi-
sion requirement); State v. Fonville, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2011) (same, concluding constitutionally defective performance when defense coun-
sel failed to inform Fonville of the same sex offender registration requirement when 
pleading guilty to child enticement); Com. v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010), appeal granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. Nov. 30, 2010) (same, forfeiture of pension as 
a result of misdemeanor sex offense conviction); In re C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 
2010 WL 2926541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jul. 23, 2010) (same, lifetime supervision 
for juvenile who pled to sex offense). See generally Punishment to Regulation, supra 
note 70 (describing cases extending Padilla’s holding to collateral consequences other 
than deportation).  
 82. See supra notes 67–69; see also Love, Punishment to Regulation, supra note 
70 (describing post-Padilla developments in due process case law).  
 83. In April 2011, the Attorney General of the United States wrote to the attor-
neys general of all fifty states “encourag[ing]” them “to evaluate the collateral conse-
quences in [their] state[s]—and to determine whether those that impose burdens on 
people convicted of crime without increasing public safety should be eliminated.” 
See, e.g., Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Vermont Attorney 
General William H. Sorrell (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://onlawyering.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/VT-Attorney-General-Sorrell.0001-1.pdf (“[G]ainful em-
ployment and stable housing are key factors that enable people with criminal convic-
tions to avoid future arrest and incarceration.”).  The letter indicated that the Justice 
Department “intend[s] to conduct a similar review of federal collateral consequences 
identified in the American Bar Association study.” Id. 
 84. If Padilla requires competent counsel in connection with any guilty plea that 
triggers the penalty of deportation, it would extend the holding of Alabama v. Shel-
ton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (“A suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual 
deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was ac-
corded ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged.” (quot-
ing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (2006))). 
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make a mockery of the current ABA Standard warning that defense 
counsel should “under no circumstances . . . recommend to a defend-
ant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of 
the case has been completed.”85  At the same time, the severity of the 
penalties to which even misdemeanants are now exposed lends consti-
tutional force to policy arguments that clients charged with minor 
crimes should not be compelled to plead as a condition of release.  If 
“prevailing professional norms” forbid a lawyer to advise a client to 
plead at first appearance before adequate investigation and counsel-
ing can take place, any such plea would be entered in the absence of 
genuine defense representation, and would thus be vulnerable to con-
stitutional challenge.86  It is safe to predict that an insistence on a 
genuine opportunity for counseling in light of the severity of potential 
collateral consequences will result either in fewer pleas or, in time, 
fewer consequences.87 
CONCLUSION 
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards have been recognized by the 
Supreme Court as one of the most important sources for determining 
defense counsel competence under the Sixth Amendment.  Because 
the constitutional test is whether defense counsel’s performance was 
“reasonable” under “prevailing professional norms,” it is necessarily 
an evolving one.  Accordingly, it behooves defender organizations to 
take an active role in the ABA Standards process to guide the devel-
 
 85. See DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, Standard 4-6.1(b). See 
generally Roberts, supra note 72 (describing lack of misdemeanor representation 
guidance in standards for defense representation).   
 86. In certain limited circumstances it may be in the client’s interest to enter a 
plea at arraignment, as for example where detention may result in deportation with-
out regard to conviction.  In such a case, the record during the guilty plea colloquy 
should reflect that counsel has had an opportunity to fully investigate.  Counsel 
should attempt to ensure that the plea is not to charges that necessarily result in de-
portation.   
 87. See Love, Punishment to Regulation, supra note 70, at 36 (“Because the par-
ties to plea negotiations must be able to deal with the immediate issues presented by 
the criminal case without the distractions represented by a defendant’s concerns over 
status-generated penalties, Padilla will in time lead away from the punitive model il-
lustrated by the pension forfeiture in Abraham toward an administrative law model, 
where penalties are reasonably related to the criminal conduct, and more flexibly ap-
plied.  When prosecutors find it harder to craft acceptable plea offers because of col-
lateral sanctions, when defendants are willing to risk going to trial to avoid them, and 
when judges are moved to set pleas aside because the agreed-upon deal later seems 
unfair, the system of collateral consequences that traps so many in a degraded social 
status must change.”). 
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opment of defender obligations under the Sixth Amendment.  In ad-
dition, to the extent the courts give the Standards credence in judging 
ineffective assistance claims, they can be powerful catalysts for chang-
ing the behavior of other actors in the process, as well as system 
norms.  Finally, the Standards can be leveraged to help defense attor-
neys gain access to the additional resources necessary to comply with 
their constitutional obligations post-Padilla.  In a word, the Standards 
can and should be used as a sword and a shield by defenders who are 
determined not to let the crisis moment the Padilla decision presents 
go unimproved. 
